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Hierarchy is one of the most conspicuous features of numerous natural, technological and 
social systems1,2,3,4.  The underlying structures are typically complex and their most relevant 
organizational principle is the ordering of the ties among the units they are made of according 
to a network displaying hierarchical features5,6,7,8.  In spite of the abundant presence of 
hierarchy no quantitative theoretical  interpretation of the origins of a multi-level, knowledge-
based social network exists. Here we introduce an approach which is capable of reproducing 
the emergence of a multi-levelled network structure based on the plausible assumption that 
the individuals (representing the nodes of the network) can make the right estimate about the 
state of their changing environment to a varying degree. Our model accounts for a 
fundamental feature of knowledge-based organizations: the less capable individuals tend to 
follow those who are better at solving the problems they all face. We find that relatively simple 
rules lead to hierarchical self-organization and the specific structures we obtain possess the 
two, perhaps most important features of complex systems: a simultaneous presence of 
adaptability and stability. In addition, the performance (success score) of the emerging 
networks is significantly higher than the average expected score of the individuals without 
letting them copy the decisions of the others. The results of our calculations are in agreement 
with a related experiment9,10 and can be useful from the point of designing the optimal 
conditions for constructing a given complex social structure as well as understanding the 
hierarchical organization of such biological structures of major importance as the regulatory 
pathways11  or the dynamics of neural networks.12
We have developed an approach to address the question of the spontaneous emergence of 
hierarchical networks, since in spite of the widespread presence of hierarchy most of the related 
questions are still open. Why is hierarchy so common? In the case of living matter or social systems 
there must be an advantage of such an organization, because of the permanent evolution of these 
systems preferring the more efficient (having a larger fitness) variants. But where is this advantage? 
Better adaptability? A more efficient, robust, stable structure? A faster spreading of relevant 
information? Remarkably, it is rather difficult to provide answers to the above questions in the 
context of a quantitative analysis. Prior attempts have shown that hierarchical organization can be 
advantageous, but either have not addressed the network aspect of  the dominance13,14 hierarchies or 
considered the embedded15,16,17,18 cases and, consequently, have not resulted in explaining the 
emergence of the kind of  multi-level hierarchical networks containing directed edges, i.e., flow-
hierarchies, into which individuals in various societies (including both human and animal) are 
typically situated.  
Building and investigating a simple model that spontaneously leads to hierarchical 
organization may significantly deepen our insight into collective decision making processes based 
on well structured leadership relations resulting in  better performance. The most common approach 
used to treat complex social relations and the associated dilemmas has been network and game 
theory19,20. It has been widely acknowledged that relatively simple models (sets of rules) can 
adequately account for a number of social or economical situations. A number of outstanding results  
have been obtained to describe e.g., the behaviour of markets21,22, while in another, quickly growing 
alternative direction, the so called agents interact in such a way that according to the corresponding 
rules of the models the agents are optimizing their benefits23.  Consequently, we have designed a 
model, which due to its simplicity is applicable to a wide range of actual systems displaying 
hierarchical structure.  
Thus, we look at a society as a system that evolves in the direction of optimizing the (not yet 
defined) benefits of its units while using up the possibly smallest amount of resources (costs). The 
essential question we address is the following: is there any relatively simple mechanism  based on 
obvious assumptions and still leading to a complex hierarchical network observed in most societies 
made up of predominantly selfish (inherently non-cooperating) individuals/actors? Such a network 
would suggests the existence of a kind of cooperation, or at least a situation in which the individuals 
feel interested to occupy their varying positions. 
First of all, it can be argued that most of the problem solving situations involve an 
estimation of the right answer24. Our assumptions take into account that i) the groups of individuals 
are typically embedded into a changing environment and better adaptation to the changes (finding 
out about the new state of the environment as soon as possible) is one of the core advantages an 
individual or, alternatively, the whole group can have.  Importantly, ii)  the abilities of the 
individuals to gain advantage from their environment on their own is obviously diverse, thus, iii) 
individuals are trying to follow the decisions of their group mates (learn from them) in proportion 
with the degree they trust the level of judgment of the other actors as compared to their own level of 
competence. iv) Maintaining a decision-making connection with a group mate has a cost (effort). 
When these common and natural assumptions are integrated into our model, the process results in 
the emergence of a collaboration-like structure in which the leader-follower relationships manifest 
themselves in the form of a multi-level, directed hierarchical network. Neglecting any of the above 
four points leads to loosing the emergence of a multi-level hierarchical structure.
Before specifying the rules of the model, we define a changing environment (the state of 
which the individuals have to guess to gain benefit) that is as simple as possible, while still varying 
in an unpredictable way. The state of the environment is chosen to have one of the l (1,2 ... l), where
l is the number of states the environment can have.  A given state is randomly replaced with a 
randomly chosen other one with a probability p, thus, the characteristic time between flips is about 
1/p steps during which the units can "learn" about the environment's actual value.  
The main steps of our basic model are (see also Fig. 1):
1.  Each individual has a pre-defined ability or fitness ai (crucially: not a priori known by 
the other individuals25) to make a proper guess (with probability ai) of the state of the environment. 
Their actual guess in each turn of the iterative process of building up a network is based on trust 
(nominations and choice from the other’s decisions based on the trust matrix, see below) by making 
a weighted average of the decisions of the most trusted k=1,2 ..n friends/colleagues/players and 
his/her own estimate (for details of 1. 2. and 3. see the Supplementary Information (SI)). In 
addition, the number of times the decision of a given individual i  can be copied in a time step is 
constrained so that it lies within a pre-defined interval (typically from 2 to 7) since maintaining 
connections by i has a cost.
2. After everyone completed a round of making their guesses/estimates, the actual state of 
the environment is revealed, letting the units  learn which ones of them have made the right 
guess/decision.
3. The above information allows the construction of an updated trust matrix T. The ij-th 
element, Tij, of the trust matrix is proportional to the number of times individual i made use of the 
decision of individual j (acceptance) in such a way that the decision by j contributed positively to 
the correct guess.  
The above process goes on iteratively and typically converges to a trust matrix having values 
depending on a non-trivial way on the original ai  values due to the stochastic non-linear dynamics 
defined above (propagation, decision and feedback, see Fig.1). Obviously, this simplest variant (1-
3) can be easily modified to take into account additional common factors influencing the decisions 
of the individuals.  
Figure 1: Schematic explanation of the main stages of a single step in our model.  The 
environment is assumed to have two states: green and red. Nodes of the graph represent the 
individuals in the model and they are coloured according to their response in the last round (green 
or red). In the nomination phase, an edge from node A to node B means that A intends to seek 
advice from B. In the acceptance phase, the directions of the edges are reversed: a black edge from 
A to B with a tick mark means that A will advise B; a gray edge with a cross means that A refused 
to advise B in this round. In the propagation phase, edges represent the direction of information 
propagation and their colour is equal to the last response (i.e. colour) of the source node. The 
rightmost panel describes how the new responses of the individuals are derived from their own 
judgment and the information they received from others.
Thus, the main outcome of our model is an evolving and converging trust matrix expressing 
the level/strength of the social ties emerging as a result of the multiple interactions aimed at 
adapting to the changing environment as efficiently as possible. In this approach the individuals are 
optimizing their behaviour by simply copying decisions from the better performing ones. It is this 
trust matrix which – after appropriate evaluation and visualization – possesses the information 
about the hierarchical nature of the collective decision making process. A typical run starts with a 
uniform (except the diagonal) trust matrix which then evolves in time in such a way that after some 
time, the permanently changing T more or less suddenly jumps into a state which optimizes the 
overall performance of the group to a much higher degree than a random matrix. 
If we assume that the network representing the trust matrix contains its most relevant 
elements (the strongest ties between the actors), then using a few natural criteria the corresponding 
network can be derived. Once a graph representation of the trust matrix is obtained, we can proceed 
to defining  quantities characterizing the extent of hierarchy present in the graph. We will use two 
complementary measures: the normalized fraction of forward arcs26 and the so-called global 
reaching centrality (GRC) as defined in Ref. 27.  
Figure 2: Behaviour and performance of our model as a function of time and noise for various 
ability distributions.  The columns correspond to constant, normal, log-normal and power-law 
fitness distributions with a mean fitness of 0.25 and a variance of 1/48. The upper row corresponds 
to the case of no noise; the middle row corresponds to 20% relative noise. The green and blue lines 
correspond to two hierarchy measures (fraction of forward arcs26 and global reaching centrality27, 
expressed as numbers between 0 (no hierarchy) to 1 (maximal hierarchy that is theoretically 
possible).  Red lines indicate the improvement of the overall performance of the individuals, 
expressed as percentages on the right axis. The heat maps in the bottom line represent the 
improvement as a function of time and relative noise level; note that the log-normal and power-law 
distributions are more tolerant to noise than the normal ability distribution (for more detailed 
definitions of the above quantities see the SI). Each data point is averaged from 500 trials with 
N=256 individuals; error bars represent the standard error of the mean but they are smaller than the 
corresponding markers on the plot. A smaller scale run of the model is visualized by the 
Supplementary Video 1.
The simulations we present here were conducted on groups of 256 agents. The model was 
run for 1000 time steps, and each data point on the plots was averaged from 500 simulations. We 
have assumed no noise (i.e. η = 0). The results for different classes of ability (fitness) distributions 
are presented in Fig. 2. For each distribution class we have studied (constant, normal, log-normal 
and Pareto, i.e., algebraic), the mean of the distribution was set to 0.25 and the standard deviation 
was set to sqrt(1/48) - the latter was chosen because this is the standard deviation of the uniform 
distribution on the [0; 0.5] interval.  The results show a strong tendency of the model to promote 
hierarchical organization among the agents. However, there are some remarkable differences 
resulting from the various distributions we considered. Noise was introduced through adding a 
Gaussian distributed random value at the nomination phase (Fig. 1) to the perceived ability scores 
with a standard deviation expressed in percents of the average fitness.
We also plotted the cumulative performance improvement gained by the agents from 
copying decisions. An abbreviated version of the definition of the performance improvement of a 
given agent (for details see the SI) involves the average number of its good guesses taken into 
account with an exponentially decaying weight (backward from the given time step and with a 
"half-time" of 50 steps). Then, to obtain a relative improvement, the average ability is subtracted 
from this “score” and the result is divided by the average ability.  We find that fat-tailed 
distributions not only promote the emergence of hierarchy in the model but also enable the actors to 
reach a consensus state where the vast majority copies the decision of a single leader in the largest 
component. In contrast, constant and normal distributions give rise to many competing leaders, each 
with their own subset of followers, and the different leaders do not communicate with each other. 
The performance improvement score shows significant (in cases well over 100%) improvement for 
the power law distribution as compared to, e.g., the constant distribution that results in no 
measurable improvement. 
Figure 3: Qualitative comparison of the experimental and the modelling results. The bottom 
network was generated by our approach showing features similar to those obtained during the 
Liskaland experiment. The data were plotted using the method introduced in Ref. 27.
Naturally, our approach is relevant to the better understanding of the existing complex 
systems if its results agree qualitatively, or, ideally, quantitatively with those observed in nature or 
society. Here we shall take two approaches. In the first one we show that the main parameters of the 
networks we obtain are very similar to a selection of real systems. Table 2 in the Supplementary 
Information demonstrates that indeed this is the case for a variety of real-life networks described in  
the literature.Further significant evidence in favour of our approach comes from an experiment 
which has recently been carried out aiming at observing how the leadership-followership relations 
are built up among the members of a group of 86 people. In the setting of the experiment the human 
actors are participating in a process in which they are interested in gaining advantage (making a 
larger amount of virtual money) during a camp organized along the economic theory of Liska9. 
During the experiment the participants were interested in getting good advice from other 
participants and the information about their tendencies to follow others were recorded using an on-
line questionnaire (for details see Refs. 9. and 10.). Fig. 3 shows the outcome of the experimentally 
registered network of directed interactions between the human participants built up during their one 
week long interactions as compared to one of the typical hierarchical networks our model predicts, 
for the same parameters as those of the experimentally observed network, i.e., 73 nodes (13 
participants remained segregated) and 142 edges. The good qualitative and quantitative agreement 
between the experimental and the model network provides a promising evidence in favour of our 
approach.
One of our main propositions drawn from the numerical experiments is concerned with the 
effect of perturbations on the kind of hierarchical structures we obtained. To get an insight into this 
important question we carried out the following simulation of the model. We let the emerging 
structure converge to a meta-stable state, and then, after 500 time steps increased the relative 
amount of noise to 40% of the mean of the ability values. The results are illustrated on Fig. 4. 
Figure 4: The effect of transient noise on the structure of the model and the fitness matrix. 
t=0 represents a starting configuration where the improvement has already converged to a 
stationary level in the absence of noise. A relative noise of 40% was added to the model between 
t=500 and t=3500.  The panels on the right show a 16x16 sub-matrix of the fitness matrix at t=500 
(i.e. before the noise was turned on) and at t=4000 (i.e. after the noise was turned off). Note how 
the performance improvement increased at t > 3500 compared to the baseline level between t=0 
and t=500, and that the estimates in the fitness matrix became more diverse since the agents were 
forced to experiment with the structure of the communication graph due to the high level of noise. 
A small-scale simulation of the above kind is visualized by the Supplementary Video 2.
As expected, introducing relatively large perturbations resulted in a strong restructuring of 
the trust matrix leading to a sharp decrease of the improvement value. After this, with time, the 
system was gradually improving, in a way adapting to the larger magnitude of the noise. Finally, 
when the noise was completely switched off at time step 3500, the simulations showed a very fast 
growth in the improvement accompanied with a sharply increasing values of the hierarchy 
measures.
In conclusion, intuition would suggest the optimal network would be a very simple 2 level 
hierarchy in which all of the actors would copy the estimates of the best individual (the one with the 
highest ai). However, this is not what happens and there are good reasons for that. First of all, due to 
the stochastic nature of making decisions, some of the units with a smaller ability may guess the 
right state in a given round (thus, building up trust in them and placing them on a higher level of the 
hierarchy), while an individual with a higher ability   may fail to do so. Second, since the individuals 
with the best abilities have a relatively small number of maximal contacts, there is a constraint 
leading to a "chain" of interactions through which agents with smaller abilities can connect 
themselves to the best performing ones. 
 Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the hierarchical structures we obtain is their stability 
against perturbations. Once a "locally" optimal network is obtained (due to the mechanism of 
copying decisions with the above mentioned aspects) it has a strong tendency to stay on, since its 
restructuring to a more efficient network would involve going through configurations which are 
much less efficient. This is rather reminiscent to those occurring in many systems described in 
terms of statistical mechanics, for example configurations into which the so called spin glasses 28  
freeze into at low temperatures. Thus our generic model quantitatively exhibits the two main and 
non-trivial (because acting in opposite directions) features of complex systems (such as, e.g., 
organisms or organizations) which are i) their capability to adopt to the changing environment while 
ii) still maintaining their essential structure (adaptation versus stability). These features show up 
most remarkably in the case of highly skewed ability distributions.
Methods Summary
Model description
Our model contains n independent individuals embedded in a l-state discrete environment. 
The simulation consists of steps, and within each step, individuals must infer the current state of the 
environment. State changes occur between steps with probability p. The fitness of individual i (i.e. 
the probability of inferring the state on its own) is denoted by ai. Each individual knows its own 
fitness but not the fitness of others.
Individuals are allowed to seek advice from their peers, and the final decision of each 
individual is based on a weighted average of the individual's own guess and the information 
received from others. Individuals strive to select partners with high fitness scores and therefore 
estimate the fitness of others based on the number of interactions between them and the number of 
times the information exchanged was correct. The number of contacts an individual tries to 
establish in a single round inversely depends on its own fitness. At the same time, the number of 
contact requests individual i can handle is limited by its link capacity ci.
Measuring group performance and hierarchy
Individuals get a score of 1 per round when responding correctly and zero when they 
respond incorrectly. The performance of an individual is the exponential moving average of its 
scores with a half-life of 50 steps, and the performance of the group is the average performance of 
its members. The group performance score is compared to the baseline performance with no 
communication – this is equal to the average fitness within the group. The relative improvement of 
the group is defined as the group performance divided by the average fitness score, minus one.
We also define the communication network as a snapshot of the interactions in a given round 
of the model where an edge points from individual i to j if i provided information to j in that round. 
The extent of hierarchy in the network is evaluated by the global reaching centrality27 and the 
normalized size of the largest cycle-free arc set26.
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Model description
Our model contains n independent individuals that are embedded in an environment which is always in 
exactly one of k possible states. The simulation consists of rounds and the state of the environment is 
constant within a round but may change states between rounds with probability p. When a state change 
occurs, the new state is always selected uniformly randomly from the set of possible states minus the 
current state of the environment.
The goal of the individuals in each round of the simulation is to find out the current state of the 
environment. Individuals that “guess” or “infer” the state of the environment accurately gain positive 
feedback (e.g., a score of 1) at the end of each round, while those that do not manage to infer the state 
of the environment receive negative feedback (e.g., get a score of zero). The total score of an individual  
is an exponentially moving average of all the feedback received during the simulation, with a half-life 
of 50 rounds. In other words, the weight of feedback diminishes exponentially over time in a way that 
feedback received 50 rounds ago has weight 0.5, feedback received 100 rounds ago has weight 0.25 
and so on.
The individuals in the simulation differ in their ability of inferring the state of the environment 
correctly without any external input. The probability of individual i responding correctly in a round on 
its own is denoted by ai, which we will call the ability of the individual from now on. In other words, 
when an individual is forced to decide on its own, it chooses the current state of the environment with 
probability ai or chooses a different state uniformly at random with probability 1-ai . It is important to 
note that each individual is aware of its own ability but does not know the ability of others a priori.
The hierarchical structure emerges from the exchange of information between the individuals. The 
exact mechanism of information exchange will be described later. Here we only mention that 
individuals are allowed to seek advice from others and take their guesses into account when making 
their own decision, and they strive to select partners with high ability scores. Since the exact ability 
scores are not publicly available, each individual maintains a vector of estimated ability scores of 
others. In particular, let tij denote the ability score of individual j as perceived (or estimated) by 
individual i. tij  depends on two variables: nij, the number of rounds in which individual j passed 
information to individual i, and sij, the number of rounds in which the information that individual j 
passed to individual i turned out to be correct. tij is then calculated as follows:
tij=
s ij+1
nij+k
where the constants in the numerator and denominator serve the purpose of providing a meaningful 
estimate even in the absence of interaction between individuals i and j (i.e. when nij is zero). The above 
formula is consistent with the Laplace-Bayes estimator for k possible outcomes. We assume that tii is 
equal to ai, i.e. each individual knows its ability score exactly.
Finally, we introduce limitations on the number of contacts an individual is allowed to establish within 
a single round. Since the propagation of information is asymmetric (i.e. individual i may not 
necessarily reveal its own opinion to individual j when he asks j's opinion), we impose constraints both 
on the number of other individuals a given person will try to contact in a round and on the number of 
other individuals a given person can provide information to; the latter will be referred to as the link 
capacity ci for individual i. The number of contacts an individual tries to establish depends on its own 
ability: highly fit individuals will try to establish a smaller number of contacts since they confide in 
their own opinion, while individuals with a lower ability will compensate by asking more people 
around them. The link capacities are drawn from a uniform distribution to model the fact that some 
people are more social and/or have better “management” or “organizational” skills than others.  Table 
summarizes the concepts and notations we have introduced so far.
Notation Description
n The number of individuals
l The number of states in the environment
p Probability of state change
a1, a2, …, an The ability scores of the individuals
c1, c2, …, cn The link capacities of the individuals
k The maximum number of peers that an individual may 
ask in a single round
tij The ability of individual j as perceived by i
nij Number of rounds in which individual i asked j
sij Number of rounds in which individual i received correct 
information from individual j
Table 1: Parameters and notations used in the model description
Each round of the game consists of five phases as follows:
1. In the nomination phase, each individual assembles a list of individuals they wish to receive 
information from in the current round. In particular, an individual with ability ai will nominate 
k(1-ai)partners (rounded up to the nearest integer), where k denotes the maximum number of 
individuals that one can ask in a single round. This formula essentially scales the number of 
partners linearly from 1 to m as the ability decreases from 1 to 0. The partners are nominated 
based on their perceived ability: individual i will nominate those that he assumes to be the fittest 
based on his own experience. Ties in perceived ability scores are broken randomly. Individuals 
then nominate an additional k(1-ai) peers who will act as a backup in case someone rejects the 
contact request in the next phase due to link capacity constraints.
2. In the acceptance phase, each individual accepts at most ci partners from those who wish to 
contact him, preferring those with whom he has also been in contact in the previous round. The 
remaining partners that nominated the individual will be rejected and no information will be 
propagated to them in this round.
3. In the propagation phase, everyone sends their guess from the previous round to all the 
communication partners they have accepted.
4. In the decision phase, everyone calculates the majority opinion based on the information they 
received and their own guess with respect to the state of the current round. Pieces of 
information from others are weighted by the estimated ability scores of the partners the 
information came from, while the own opinion is weighted by the actual ability score. We wish 
to stress that the information received from others is based on the previous round, meaning that 
there is a penalty associated to relying too much on others since the state of the environment 
might have changed in the current round.
5. In the feedback phase, the current state of the environment is revealed to everyone. Each 
individual then re-calculates the perceived ability of others by updating the nij and sij counters: 
nij is increased by 1 for every individual j that i received information from, while sij is increased 
by 1 for every individual j whose information turned out to be correct.
The phases described above are then iterated for a number of rounds, allowing the matrix of perceived 
ability scores and also the communication network to evolve into a configuration where the overall 
performance of the group is higher than the baseline performance that we would have observed if we 
allowed no communication. The performance measures and the structural properties of the 
communication network will be described in the next section.
In the manuscript, we describe several simulations where the behaviour of the individuals was 
perturbed by random noise. Noise was injected in the nomination phase (see item 1 above) where we 
added Gaussian noise with zero expected value and a given standard deviation to the perceived ability 
scores. In order to make the amount of noise comparable with the average ability of the individuals, we 
express the standard deviation of the noise as a percentage relative to the average ability, and we refer 
to this quantity as relative noise. A relative noise of 100% means that the standard deviation of the 
noise component is exactly as large as the average ability of the individuals.
Measuring group performance and the extent of hierarchy
The overall performance of the group depends on the number of times the members of the group 
managed to infer the state of the environment correctly. Since each member responds on its own, we 
will simply calculate individual performance scores and define the overall performance of the group as 
the average performance of its members.
Let us assume that individuals responding correctly in a round are awared a score of 1, while incorrect 
answers result in a score of zero. The performance of an individual is then simply defined as the 
exponential moving average of its entire score history, where the weight of the most recent data point is 
1 and the weights of past data points decay in an exponential manner. It is common to define the decay 
factor in terms of a half-life constant , meaning that the weight of a feedback received  steps ago is 
exactly 1/2; the weight of a feedback received 2 steps ago is 1/4 and so on. In our simulations,  was 
chosen to be 50. To avoid transients in the early stages of the simulation when the score history is 
significantly less than the half-life of the exponential moving average, we assume that the score history 
is preceded by an infinite sequence of ai values, representing the fact that the individual would have 
received a feedback of ai  per round on average if we ran the simulation for a long time without 
allowing communication.
This latter observation also allows us to define a baseline to which we can compare the group 
performance. If we disallowed communication, member i of the group would have obtained a 
performance score of ai  after an infinite number of steps since he succeeds in inferring the state of the 
environment on its own with probability ai. The baseline performance of the group can then be defined 
as the average ability score within the group. Finally, we can define the relative improvement of the 
group performance as the group performance divided by the average ability score minus one. A relative 
improvement of zero thus means that the group performs exactly as well as a hypothetical group 
without communication, a relative improvement of 1 (or 100%) means that the group performs twice as 
well as the baseline group, and so on.
Besides measuring the overall performance of the group, we are also interested in measuring whether 
there are signs of a hierarchical organization in the communication network among the individuals. The 
communication network is simply defined as a snapshot of the interactions in a given round of the 
game; the nodes of the networks represent the individuals, and an edge points from individual i to j in 
the network representation if i provided information to j in the round being examined. The extent of 
hierarchy present in the network is evaluated by two independent means: the global reaching centrality 
measure defined by Mones et al (2012) and the normalized size of the largest cycle-free arc set.
The global reaching centrality of a network is measured as follows. Let us define the local reaching 
centrality CR(i) of node i in the network as the number of other nodes that are reachable from it via 
directed paths divided by n-1, where n is the number of nodes in the network. Furthermore, let CR
max(i) 
denote the maximal local reaching centrality in the network. The global reaching centrality GRC is then 
defined as follows:
GRC=
∑
i=1
n
[C Rmax −C R (i ) ]
n − 1
The value of the global reaching centrality of a network is high when the maximal local reaching 
centrality is significantly different from the local reaching centrality of most of the nodes; in other 
words, if there are only a few nodes from where the whole network can be reached while most other 
nodes can reach only a small part of the network. GRC scores are strictly non-negative and the 
maximal GRC value of 1 is attained for star graphs. Regular and irregular trees also have a high GRC 
score, while Erdős-Rényi random networks attain a low GRC score of around 0.058  0.005 (Mones et 
al, 2012).
An alternative hierarchy measure we consider is the normalized size of the largest cycle-free arc set. 
Consider an arbitrary total ordering of the nodes of a network. An edge of the network is called a 
forward arc with respect to the ordering if the edge points from a node with smaller rank towards a 
node with larger rank, otherwise the edge is called a feedback arc. Note that the sub-graph that consists 
of forward arcs or feedback arcs only is cycle-free by definition. The largest cycle-free arc set is thus 
the set of forward arcs in an ordering that yields the largest such set. The usage of the largest cycle-free 
arc set as a proxy for measuring the hierarchy is justified by the intuition that a network is more 
hierarchical if we need to remove a smaller number of edges to make it cycle-free. 
The size of the largest cycle-free arc set on its own is an un-normalized measure in the sense that nodes 
of completely random Erdős-Rényi networks (which have no built-in hierarchy by definition) can still 
exhibit a relatively large cycle-free arc set, especially if the network is sparse and consists of many 
disconnected components. To this end, we measure the normalized size of the largest cycle-free arc set 
instead. For a network with n nodes and an average degree of d, the normalization is done by 
subtracting the expected size of the largest cycle-free arc set in an Erdős-Rényi network with the same 
number of nodes and average degree from the observed size of the largest cycle-free arc set, and 
dividing it by the number of edges minus the expected size. This normalization yields a score with a 
theoretical maximum of 1; furthermore, the normalized score will be zero if the network contains 
exactly as many forward arcs as an Erdős-Rényi network with the same number of nodes and edges.
Calculating the exact size of the largest cycle-free arc set is NP-hard, especially for k-edge-connected 
graphs where each edge participates in many cycles. However, there exist heuristics that approximate 
the size of the largest forward arc set (and thus the largest cycle-free arc set) accurately in sparse graphs 
(Eades et al 1993). In our study, we used the following simple approximation scheme (Eades et al, 
1993) that runs in linear time with respect to the number of edges in the graph:
1. Construct two empty queues of nodes, which we call the front queue and the back queue.
2. Find all the nodes with zero in-degree, append them to the front queue and remove them from 
the graph. Repeat this step until no such nodes can be removed.
3. Find all the nodes with zero out-degree, reorder them to the back queue and remove them from 
the graph. Repeat this step until no such nodes can be removed.
4. If there is at least one node left in the graph, find the node for which the difference between its 
out-degree and in-degree is the largest, append it to the front queue, remove it from the graph 
and continue from step 2.
5. Append the back queue to the front queue to obtain the final ordering. The approximated 
forward arc set can then be derived from the ordering.
The expected size of the largest cycle-free arc set in Erdős-Rényi networks was determined with 
simulations. For each required value of the network density d, we generated 1000 Erdős-Rényi 
networks, searched the largest forward arc set with the above heuristic, and averaged the size of these 
sets over all the generated instances.
Model parameters to generate real-world-like networks
In this section, we present several real-world networks and describe them with three key parameters of 
interest: the number of nodes N, the average degree <k> and the global reaching centrality GRC 
(Mones et al, 2012), the latter serving as a quantification of the extent of hierarchy present in the 
network. We claim that it is possible to set the parameters of our model in a way that the 
communication network between the individuals yields similar average node degrees and a similar 
GRC measure. Table 2 of this Supplementary Information contains the key parameters of the real-world 
networks we have studied and the values of these parameters obtained from an appropriate 
parameterization of the model. Table3  contains the exact parameter settings we used to obtain our 
results with the model. The general guidelines to set the parameters were as follows:
 The number of individuals is equal to the number of nodes in the real-world network.
 The environment has 5 states and a state change occurs with probability 0.1 between steps.
 The individual ability scores are Pareto-distributed with mean  (given in Table 3) and a 
variance of 1/48.
 Link capacities are uniformly distributed between clow and chigh (given in Table 3).
 The maximum number of peers that an individual may ask in a single round are given by k in 
Table 3.
 The relative noise added to the perceived ability scores is given by  in Table 3.
Network N <k>real GRCreal <k>model GRCmodel
Prison3 67 2.716 0.172 2.617 ± 0.14 0.181 ± 0.11
Liskaland4 71 1.971 0.308 2.060 ± 0.10 0.288 ± 0.09
TRN-Yeast5 688 1.568 0.116 1.672 ± 0.11 0.158 ± 0.07
C.elegans6 1173 2.442 0.048 2.570 ± 0.18 0.095 ± 0.02
Table 2: Comparison of real-world networks with synthetic networks generated by our model. The
number of nodes N was identical for both networks. <k>real and <k>model are the average degrees in the
real network and the synthetic networks. GRCreal and GRCmodel are the global reaching centrality
(Mones et al, 2012) of the real and the synthetic networks. Values for the synthetic networks were
averaged from at least 20 instances at t=1000 and are given as mean ± standard deviation.
Network  clow chigh k 
Prison 0.25 3 10 3 40%
Liskaland 0.4 1 7 3 30%
TRN-Yeast 0.25 1 3 2 10%
C.elegans 0.35 3 15 3 40%
Table 3: Model parameters that generate networks with average degrees and global reaching
centrality (GRC) scores similar to real networks.
Supplementary video clips
Supplementary video 1. Starting from a random network of 73 agents, the rule of copying the 
decisions of the most trusted neighbours results in a relatively quickly converging hierarchical network 
having a larger overall score (better performance) than the average of the abilities of the individuals.
Supplementary video 2. The ties among the 32 agents self-organize into a hierarchical network and 
freeze into a local maximum during the first third of the run. Next, an "annealing" is applied (the noise 
term is considerably increased). Finally, the level of noise is set back to zero and a new maximum is 
found which is both more stable and corresponds to a larger overall score 
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